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THE PRESENT STATE 
OF CHINA. 
I. 
PREI_JIMINARY. 
JF it were not for the mare ur· 
gent, and for the mom-ant, 
more dangerous problems o£ the 
Ruhr and t.he Near East, the Ghan-
cello·ries of Europe and America 
would, at the present time, be very 
much exercised in regard to condi-
tions in O:hina. The consensus o£ 
opinion in well-informed circles is 
that never since the establishment 
of the Republic, has the situation 
in this country been graver, nor the 
outlook mor~ ho·pelless, than today. 
Financially and politica.Uy, China 
appears to be abs6lutely bankrupt. 
Treaties and other engagements 
are daily being violated by the 
Provincia1l Autho'l:ities, and the so~ 
called Central Government is 
2 
powerle .s in, the £ace o£ their open 
defiance. It is sheer wa te of time 
for the Legations at Peking to 
enter protests. with, and demand 
satisfaction from, ~ Ministry o£ 
Fo·reign AffairSI which £or weeks on 
end has to carry on without a 
Minister, and which, even when 
there is an occupant of the post, 
cannot make a pretence o£ en-
forc.ing natiorn.al engag~ments. 
It is proposed• in this and sub-
sequent articles to place on record, 
as briefly as possible, the facts 
about the present state of China. 
It cann,ot be hoped that thi series 
o£ articles wiill be e,xhaustive, for 
it would require many volumes, 
and much more detailed investiga-
tion than is possible in a . news-
paper office W· give a comprehen-
sive account o£ conditions in each 
Province in, thi 1mhappy country. 
All that it can he hoped to do is to 
give an outline of the situation 
today, which may serve as aJ basis 
for comparisO'Il at some future 
date. 
China has been a Republier---hut 
a Republic in na.me, only-since 
February 1912. From the date on 
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which he assumed the Presidency 
-March 10, 1912-un,til his death 
June 1916, Yuan Shih-kai ruled 
the country as a Dicta.tor. ·with 
the aid of loyal !'llLbordina.tes he was 
a1ble, until the last few months of 
his life, cru.sh all serio.us o·p-
po i tion. From the time o£ his 
dea.th, the Central GoveiJ:nment 
virtually cea ed to exerci e any 
real authority. It has been able 
hom time to time, through com-
binations o£ its military support-
ers-or more properly, patrons-
to exercise a shadowy authority 
over certain groups o£ provinces. 
But there has not sinc.e the death 
o£ Yuan Shih-kai been a. President 
or a Government, which. could 
issue order or instructions a.pplic-
able to all the Provinces, with the 
remotest expectation that they 
would, be obeyed. 
No time need be wasted here 
over tracing, in detail, the rapid 
decline of the authority of the eo-
called Central Government. It is 
necessary £or our purpose on1ly to 
look at the results, as· they appear 
today. The T1hree E ·astern Pw-
vinoes, since Cihang Tso-lin's 
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abortive expedition against tha 
Capital in Aprill922, have virtual~ 
ly severed all relations with tbe 
Peking Administration. Ohang 
Tso-lin proclaimed his independ-
enoo after his return to Mukden, 
and has defied the Presiden,t, the 
Cabinet, and the Foreign Lega ... 
tions ever since. He has almost 
paralysed the Peking-Mukden 
Railway-the great trunk line 
connecting the Ca~pital with 
Mukden and via Mukden with tlw 
Russ1an and Japanese Rat1.way 
systems in Siberia1, and South 
Manchuri~ . and Korea, re pectiveoly 
~by stopping throrugh-traffic on 
the Ohihli-Manchuria border, and 
canying off and retaining roll.' his 
owru use twice the number o£ pas-
senger wag-ons, and neail'ly £our 
times the number o£ goods-wagons, 
that are required £or no•rmal txaffio 
outside the Great IWlall. In 
addition to thiR he stole, and still 
retains. over 200 cars belonging to 
other Chinese Government lines. 
Ouler Mongolia i still in the 
hands o£ the Reds. The Northern 
and Centrai portions o£ China 
y1roper are ccntrolled hy the Chihli 
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Militarists, General Tsao Kun at 
Paotingfu, and General Wru Pei-fu 
n,t Loyang. They, fo·r the moment, 
have the P'ekiThg Government at 
their meorcy, and though they are 
never tired of professions of loya,Jty 
to the President and the Cabinet, 
their loyalty eonsists of lip-service 
only. 'I' hey oii' their prote~Ses 
hiB.ve publicly humiliated the Pre-
sident by declinri.ng to permit his 
duly appointed nominees to assuane 
t.heir posts as Civil Governors of 
Hupeh and Kiangsi. They have, 
more recently, affronted and humi-
liated President and Cabinet 
by compelling the Governm€nt 
to a.ppoint Military Govel"'lO•rs 
o£ their own selection to the Pro. 
vinces o£ Fukien and K wangtung 
in So·uth Clhina. It was a Paoting-
fu intrigue which wrecked the last 
-the Wang Ohung-hui-Oabinet. 
In \Vklste:rn, South-Western and 
Southern China extraordinary con-
fusion prevails. Szechuan, Ohina,'s 
largest and wealthiest Province, 
which has been thie scene o£ almost 
incessant civil strife ever since the 
death o:f Yuan Shih-kai, is once 
more in the throes o£ Oivil War, in 
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which Wru Pei-£u is attemp.ting to 
intervene in the hope o£ extending 
the influence o£ the Chihli Party. 
Yunnan is again .urnlder the control 
o£ the ·ambitious Tang Ohi-yao, 
who is also reported to have designs 
on Szechuan. Kwangsi has been 
in a condition o£ albsolute anarchy 
ever since the "conquest" of the 
province by a Oantonese· Army 
a.bout two years a.go. No-one can 
predict. what the next day win 
bring forth in Kwangtung. Sun 
Yat-sen'~ recent triumphal return 
to Canton has no•t, as he expected, 
resulted in the collapse o£ tha 
opposition militarists, whose at-
titudes still remain doiUJM£ul. 
Chen Chiung-ming, who wa un-
able, chrefly owing to lack of 
fina.ncial resources, to retain his 
holn. on Canton, remains a factoc 
to be reckoned with. The Peking 
Government has delibera.tely 
af:iron,ted the Cantonese by appoint-
ing Shen Hung-ying as Tuli, or 
:Military GoJVernol'. There are con-
tinu~us unrest and uncertainty in 
Fukien and Kiangsi. And Che-
kiang has just distinguished itself 
by one o£ the mos.t flagrant vio._ 
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lations, UJp-to-date, of Ohina.'s en-
gagements in regard to the taxation 
of foreign goods in the interior. 
:Many pn)IVinc.es, including Ho-
na.n•, where General •Wlu Pei-fu 
has established h:s headquarters, 
al'e in.lested with handits. The 
whole country is seething with un~ 
rest and as i£ its internal condi-
' . tion were not serwus e4nough to 
require that every effort he con-
centrated on reorganiza,tion, the 
inesponsible elements, such as the 
students ailld professional politic-
ians, are now engaged upon a de-
liL·erate campaign to reneiW the 
anti-Japanese boycott-a. campaign 
which, if it sucoeellls, will embroil 
China with a neighbouring Power 
which during tho past twelve 
months has given convincing proof 
o& its friendly disposition by the 
settlement of the Shanrtumg ques-
tion. Lastly, there is a corrupt 
and ab urd Parliament at Peking 
whose intermittent sessio'Ils a~re 
confined to O'bstruction ()£ the ad-
ministration, and opposition to 
every reasonable pmposaJ £orr the 
adjustmenrt of China's foreign re~ 
la,tious. 
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II 
THE C.E:NTRAL GOVBR.NME.NT 
UNDER the Manchu Eimpire the 
Empl'Ior, who was an absolute 
Monarch, the "Son o£ Heaven," 
and responsible to none burt; Heaven 
for the governance o£ •hlis realm, 
appointed his own nominees as 
Vice.roys and Governors o£ the 
Provinces, and it was an inexorable 
rule tha.t no .Viceroy o·r Governor 
might rule over hi native Pro-
vince. The Viceroy or Gove!rnor, 
however, was, in turn, an a.utocrat. 
in the Provit.ees or Province over 
which he ruled, and as long as he 
remitted his quota o£ rervenues or of 
trihute to PeJiing, and there wme 
no erious clisturbances in the ter-
ritOiy under his jurisdiction, ·he 
enjoyed a very large mea ure of 
independence during his tenure of 
office. ]'orce o£ circum~tances 
compelled the Throne to assert its 
authority in JCiOinnection · with 
China,' 'foreioon relations; and dur-
ing 1 he last year o£ the Dyna ty 
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there was a tendency tOJWards grea-
ter centralization in rega.rd to 
military affairs and coiiLIUunica-
tions. It "\Via•s, it may :be tecalled, 
the assertion of Imperial a.urt;hority 
in connection with Ghina's trunk 
railways, that was the main factor 
in bringing a,.bOtUt the First Re-
volution. 
Under the Reptl blic the rule 
that no ()official might hold office 
in his own p10vince was immediate-
ly cancelled. And it. is to~day the . 
rule, rather than the exception, 
for the officiaJs of all kinds and 
grades to be natives of the Pro-
viniCe ill which they function. An 
iron hand was required, in these 
cn-cumstances, to maintain even 
the semblance of the Central Gov-
ernment' ~ authrority. Ancl though 
that authority was maintained by 
frnrce or hy intrigue, a long a 
Yuan Shih-kai lived, no orther 
Preside,nil: of t.he Chinese Re.publio 
has exercised any real control over 
the whole countly. 'l'he jealousies 
o£ the militarists, and the disrupt-
ing influences of incessant civil 
strife, have so reduiCed the pre tige 
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of the SOl-called Central Govern-
ment that, a.t the moment, it is a 
Government merely in name, in-
capable of enforcing its o:rders in 
any part of the co•lmtry. It is no 
longer practical politics to urge t.he 
establishment of a strong centraliz-
ed administration. Wha.tever 
solution may eventually be found 
f<JT China's internal difficulties, a 
laxge measure of provincial auto-
nomy will have to be conceded. It 
is imperative, .neveQ"thelef>s, that 
the authority of the Gentral Gov-
eTnment should be restored in con-
nect.ion with Ohina's foreign re-
lations, the co•ntrol of the Chinese 
armies, and the collection of cer-
ta.:in revenues, including the Salt 
taxes, th:e Income 'l'a.x, Likin, and 
the Stamp Duty. The expenses oi 
the Central Government, apart 
fmm Domestic and foreign Loan 
obligations, and "Ubsidies to tha 
military a.nd civil officials of the 
Provinces, a.re estimated at a.pp•rox-
imately nin(el million dollars per 
month. 'I'he late Mliniste!I' of Fin-
ance suggested th"lt it might be 
po ible to reduce them to fo111r 
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million dollars. The actual re-
mittances from the Provinces from 
J a,nuary to Septemb~r 1922 amount-
ed, apart from Salt and Customs 
revenuE>, to $231,000 per month. 
The C\ustoms, SaH, and fW[ne and 
Tobacco revenues a.re all pledged 
foiJ' the service of forerign or do-
mestic debts. It cannot be hoped 
to enforce uniform Inc001e Tax and 
Stamp Duty unles the collection 
of these imposts is under the oon-
trol of the Central Government. 
And unless it can control the Likin 
collec.tion, the Treaty Powers will 
n01t give their assent t,o1 the propos-
ed inorease of the Oustoms Tariff. 
Pl!:lradoxical as it may seem, cer-
tain o£ the Northern militarists 
who have themselves. been the worst 
offenders in their persistent de-
fiance, and interference with, the 
Central Government, are the strong-
est opponents of a,ny measure of 
Provincial autonomy. Their idea 
of a centralized Government for 
Oh•ina is a Government cornsisting 
entirely o£ their puppeis, which 
ta.kes orders from them' and from 
:them aJone. If the,re' were any 
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really big man among th&Se mili-
tarists, capable, uirder exis.ting con-
ditions, ot assuming and exercising 
a dictatorship over the whole 
nation, there might be something 
to be said fo1r their view. But n.ot 
one of them is of the political 
stature nece ary for the role of 
dictator over a. nation of fou11.· ·hun-
dred millions o£ 1 eople. None oi 
them has the financial or the mili-
tary resources necessary to subdue 
the eightee•n Provinces of China 
Proper, the t}_lree Manch1'u'ian Pro-
vinces, and the Outer Territories. 
'rheir appo ition, therefore, to de-
con1ralixa.tion in any iio11'1n, merely 
ha the effect of delaying the 
promulgation of the Permanent 
Oonstitution, now virtually com. 
plete except for the Cha.pter de-
:fiming the re~pective pmvers and 
Iespon'Sibilities of the Central and 
Provincial Govemmen ts . 
At the moment the functions of 
the C'entra[ GovernmeiJlt aTe, in 
theory, >ested in the PTesident, the 
Cabinet!:·, and the• two Houses of 
Padiament. Tlhe Constitution 
under which the country is sup-
po ed to be administered is the 
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provisional (Nanking) Constitu_ 
tion of 1918, the only portion of 
the Permanent Con titution which 
is actually law being the Chapter 
defining the qualifi.catiorns, method 
o:f election, and t!l'Ilure of office o£ 
the Preside'llt and Vice-President. 
There has been no Vice~President 
since August 1917. The President 
a.t the moment is General Li Yuan. 
hung, one o:f the o~I-iginal leader 
od' the Republican movemoot r,t 
\¥uchang, who was elected Vice-
President in October 1913, succeed-
ed Yuan Shih-kai :for the une'Xpir-
ed portion o,£ his teTm in June 1916, 
resigned after the Chang Hsun 
cotttp in August 1917, and reassum-
ed the Presidency at the urgent 
request of Generals Tsao Kun and 
Wu Pei-fu, and of various public 
organizations throughout the coun-
try, in June, 19'2'2. A condition 
of his !~assumption o£ office was a 
pledge from the Northern milit.ar-
sists that they would support him 
in his efforts to eliminate militar-
ism, and abo[ish the Tuchuu 
system. Needles to say they had 
no sooner induced him to rerl:.urn 
to Pekin<>' than they £orgort all 
14 
about the·ir pledge. They publicly 
defied and humiliated him. T\sao 
Kun ai\d his supporters· c.ornspired 
to supplant him, with the aid of 
their pall:lia.mentaJ.'Y p·uppets. And 
though £rom time to time the Pres-
ident has announced. his deter-
mina.tion not to submit £U1·ther to 
military dictation or inter:fleTence 
he has, in successive in ta.nces, 
been compelled to yield to their 
pressure. The present C.a.binet., 
the ninth within fifteen months, 
is a Paoting cll"ea.tion, the las.t 
Ministry having been overt.hro•wn 
as the result of a conspirac.y hatch-
ed in Pa.oting, a.nd earned out! by 
its parliamentary puppets, with 
the President as an unwilling a.c-
cessorv. Even it has found the 
inter£~rence of the Northern mili-
ta.rists intolerablle, and only a short 
time ago tendered its. resignation, 
en bloc., as a protes•t-meekly to 
return to duty when it found that 
Pa.ot.ing amd Loya.ng were obdUl"ate 
in their demands. 
On Parliament only a few words 
need be wasted. It is the Parlia-
ment elected at the beginning of 
1913, dissolved by President Yuan 
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Shih-kai in January 1914, recon-
vened by President Li Yuan-hung 
in June, 1917, again dissolved in 
June 1917, and reconvened on 
August 1, 1922. Only the most 
primitive a.rrarngements' could he 
made :for ca1·rying through the 
original elections, with the !'esult 
that the members of both houses 
consist, for the mo&t part, of pro-
fessional po·liticians of the most 
unscrupulous type. Most of the 
members, in addition to Parlia· 
mentary salari.es o·ut o:f a.lll propor-
tion to the normal standa~rd of liv-
ing in this' coruntry, draw sub idies, 
or acce·pt bribes, from the militar· 
ists, and interested politiool 
cliques. Chinese papers on several 
occasions have stated the price per 
vote paid by interested paxtioes i..o 
secure parliament.a.try support, ntnd 
these statement have never been 
contradicted. The Senate, a.fter 
more than nine month in session 
has :failed; to agree on the choice 
of the a. new Speaker. The Speaker 
of the IPwer House was, only a few 
weeks ago, stated to ha.ve been tht! 
instigator of a disgraceful brawl iu 
a Peking restaurant. From August 
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1 up to the prese~t date Parliament 
has no·t produced a single construe. 
tive piece of legislation. When it 
does meet-which is infrequently, 
owing to the difficul t.y O•f o>btaining 
a quorum in either Hous·e-it O<ften 
breaks up in diso·rder, as the resu~t 
of scuffles armO<ng the Iival factions, 
and the hurling o{ ink-bottles 
across tire flom. Yet this mons-
trosity arrogates to itself 1the right 
ro a.brogate Treaties formally CO<n-
cluded by the Central Govern-
ment. Its constant naggings, inter. 
pellations, and impeachments, 
render th,e, adjustment of any 
question adle<>.ting China's foreign 
relatioos quite impo sible. And jt 
ha, recently sought to desecrate the 
old and stately palace buildings O<i 
the Manchu Emperonl• by transfer. 
ring itself and its quarreils to the 
Halls and co1U'tvards where the 
"Son o£ Heaven'; formerly receiv-
ed the homage of his subjects, 
silent and impassive in the presence 
o·f kneeling multitu.rles•. The plight 
to which China's militarist~ and 
colfrupt. politicians. have reduced 
their country will form the theme 
of future article . 
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III. 
INSUBORDINATION IN THE 
PROVINCIES. 
THE CentJ'al Governm~nt beci.ng 
impotent, the ProVInces anll 
left very much to their own de· 
vires, with the resu~t that they are 
administered in the most ha.pha.zard 
manner. Th'e. principal authority 
in the Pl'Ovinoo ought, of course, to 
be the Civil Governor, to whom, in 
theory, are entru, rt:ed all govern-
mental activities except those 01f a 
military chaJ'acter. He is sup-
posed to control and to supEl'tvise 
all the tell'ritorial officials of lower 
rank, from the Taayin to the vil-
lage tipao, and is (in theory) res-
ponsible for foreign, fina.ncial, ed-
ucational, and to a limited extent 
judicial, a:ffa.ira throughout the 
Provin e. The Tuchun, or Mili-
tary Govet'll.orr outranks the Civil 
GovernQor, but, except in times of 
disturbance, is supposed to confine 
hi~ activities entirely to military 
affair . In mo t of the Provinces, 
1.Qo-day, the C~vil Governor is a 
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mere cipher.. . Where such an 
official ac.tually functions---and in 
many Provinces the 'l'u~hun and 
the U.i vil Governor me 011 e and the 
same perso·n-he is the subordinate 
o£ the :Military Governor, who is 
the reaJ ruler of the Prorvince. A 
prete,nce of fl.emoci'atic governme'llt 
18 maintained hy the continued 
existence of Provincial Assemblies, 
hut iu most province5 these local 
legisla.t.Uies are composed oo the 
Tuchun's nominees, or at any rate 
of servile politicians who dare no-t 
questio•n his authority. 
The aveTage Tuchun c.ares 
nothing fo•r i.he w~Ha.re of his Pro. 
vince or its population. .All of his 
energies are concentra.ted upon the 
strengthening- of his own position 
by means of the expansion 01£ the 
military forces under his com-
mand. 'I'he Provincial revenues, 
supplemented by such sums as can 
he stolen froon, or blackmailed out 
of, the CPntral Government, are 
mainly u:tilized for military ex-
penfl.iture. The Province o£ Clhih-
li, alone, maintains an army two-
thirds the size o·f that o£ Great 
Britain (exclusive ot£ India), from 
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which the population derives no 
be.nefit whatsoever, and which. · is 
iur.apable even o·f protecting life 
a.nd property within the provincial 
l:;oundaries. The maintenance of 
this useless horde of armed coolies 
absorbs not only a very large per-
renta~e orf all the revenues collec.t-
ed within the Province, but also 
nece!'sita.tes the extortion of mil-
lions of dollars per annum from the 
Peking Government. Not a loan 
c·an be raiseld, not a release of salt 
revenue can be effected, without 
Paoting claiming its shaJ:e. As 
mentioned in a previaus article, the 
late Minister or£ Finance recently 
disdosed the fact tbla.L from J anu-
ary to Reptember 1922, the total 
remittances to Peking frqm the 
Provinces amounted to only $231,-
000 pru· month, or $2,087,000 in 
all. And ag·ainst this pittance re-
mitted to Peking must be put the 
seizure o£ $31,000,000, or more 
than one third of the tc:rlal Salt 
Hevenue, "hy Provincial Authori-
ties or M.ilitary Commanders." 
'l'he Salt ReiVenues, it may be 
men•tiomed in pa.c;sing, are suppos-
ed to be paid, int.act, into a special 
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account in the Banks which pa.r-
ticipated in the flotation of the 
Reorganization Loan. 
This, however, is not by any 
mea,ns the only instancl.'l o£ de-
liberate violation of China's inte•r-
na tional engngetments by the Pro-
vincial authorities. There is 
hardly'a Province today, in whi:-:h 
foreign T'reaty rights in rega.rd to 
transit pass exemption are not 
d elibemtely and persistently vio-
lated. Tlhe Tuchuns and the·ir 
parasites are ever on, the look-out 
for additional sources of income, 
the latest example of their effron-
tery and disregard for the Treaties 
being the imposition in Chekiang, 
of a twenty per cent. tax on cigar-
et.tes,-which has been levied by the 
Tuchun with the a.ppmval a.£ the 
Provincial As emlJly. Railways, 
whose propeu-ty and l'olling-st<>ck 
have been pledged as securi1;y to 
foreign bondholders, or which owe. 
large sums to foreign and Chinese 
ereditors for equipment, ha.ve been 
s.eized by the milita.rist.s in North 
and mid-China, and operated sole-
ly for their owu benefit, l'egard-
less of the rapid deterioration of 
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the lines and their rolling-stock, 
and of China's international ob-
ligations. And as if the misa.p-
propriatioo o·£ ordina.ry Provincial 
Tevenue the loo•ting o·f the Salt 
re-venues, and the seizure o-f rail-
way earnings were not enough, 
many of the Tuc.huns are reviving 
the cnHivation of and traffic in 
opium to augment their incomes. 
In one Province alone-Shansi-
is any !lerious attempt being made 
to conduct the administration in 
i.he interests, :~nd for the welfare, 
of the population. 
Provincial jealousi€s operate to 
pt·event any serious a.ttempt at co-
operation between neighbouring 
Provinces. The provincial boun-
daries are usually the safest areas 
jn which bandits can congregate, 
for if the authorities of one pro-
vince are stined to action, the out-
laws can generally be sure of im-
munity just across the oound.a.ry. 
Seldom will the local milita.ry au 
thorities in one province loyal'ly 
co-operate with their neighbours. 
The Provincial Militarists defy 
Peking without the least compunc-
tion. The refn,.al ()l the Hupeh 
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and Kiangsi T'uchuns· to recognize, 
or to allow to assume ofrice·, Civil 
Governors appointed by the l::>r-esi-
de<nt, has already been mentioned. 
An equally flagrant exam-ple---
though in this imta.nee public 
opinion was behind the offender-
was the Shanghai Defence Com-
missioner's veto upon the reviseil 
postal tariff. The Foreign Dip-
lomats at Peking must he weary of 
recording their protests against 
Provincial insubordination, and 
deliberate violations of treat.y 
rights-protests which elicit no re-
ply at all, or else an evasive answer 
which reveals the impotence o£ the 
\Vaichiaopu. In one instance only 
dnring the pas.t few monthrJ has 
diplomatic action producecl any 
satisfactory result, and that was 
when the Diplomatic Bo1ly · a.u-
nounced its intention of despatch-
ing an InternatioiLal Commission 
to investigate the bandit outrages 
in Honan. In general the Tu-
chm:~,s simply ignore any protests. or 
representatio·ns transmitted to 
them through the Waichiaopu. 
The insubordination of t.he Pro-
vincial Authorities canno.t be over-
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come until the power orf the mili-
tarists is broken, and, as long as 
it continues, must render futile 
any schemes for financial or ad-
ministrative refol'm which are bas. 
ed upon the supposition tha,t en-
gagements entered ·into by the Oen-
tral Government wiill be loyally 
fulfilled. 
IV. 
THE ARMY. 
t\_ N Army is generally understood 
-'- to be an armed and discip-
lined force cA men, subject to the 
orders of the Government, and 
available for the defence of the 
nation against ext,ei'nal aggression, 
and the mainten•a'tlce of ill tern a . 
order. In this sense China pos-
ses es no army. There are, ex-
clusive of some tens of thousands 
of bandits i:Q various parts of the 
country, upwards of 1,332,000 men 
under anns in various national and 
provincial units--a larger number 
of armed men than is maintained 
by any other· country in the worltl. 
But these armed hor•des are not 
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availaMe for, and would be utterly 
useless in, repelling foreign aggres-
sion. Of the million and a, third 
men who carry rifles and wear 
uniforms o£ some descrription or 
another, there are not thirty-thou-
sand whO' would be capable o± 
offering effective resistal!lce to hal£ 
their number of properly equippeu 
and well-disciplined J a.pane"e, 
Ameiican, or European troops. The 
Ghinese armies are not. und1!r the 
orders or control of the Central 
Government or o£ Parliament, Lut 
are employed by, and recognize no 
authority other than that of, the 
Tuehu.ns. During the last iew 
years o£ the Manchu regime a 
serious a.t.tempt was made to o·r-
ganize a modern, national army, o·f 
360,000 trained troops. This Lu 
Chun or national army has becomP 
r..oo:npl etely disintegrated since the 
Revolution. The President of the 
Republic and the Cabinet cannot 
rely upon the SiUpport of a single 
Division in the event of any sud-
den emergency. No serious ~·.t­
t~mpt is made, to-day, to stan· 
dardize arms, uniforins, equipment 
or ammunition. At least seven 
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types of rifles ~·e known to be i J' 
u'ie and there IS an even greatrr 
variety of artillery and machine-
O'UllS. There is no central com-
~and the War Ministry and GPn-
eral 'gt,a.ff exercising no eontrol 
whatsoever over the Tuchuns' 
forces. T~ere is no practical pln.n 
of mobilizatio'll o;r concentration. 
Unless two Provinces ha.ppen to· be 
under the control o£ the <arne 
Super-Tucbun or Tuchun, no• forr.e 
located in one Province would b.e 
available for operations in another. 
As a ddence against foreign 
invasion, therefore, China's nrrmed 
forre.'io are utterlly uReless. But -for 
the difficulties of communicatim1. 
due to the a b. ence o£ roads E'U i~­
ahle for wheeled transpoi"t, onP. 
well-equipped foreig-n Divisio·u 
could march from end to end of thf\ 
c'otmtry. As it is, a Foreign Divi-
~ion, ·upported by :1 small navn I 
force, and equipped with aeJ·o-
plnnes and modern artillery, could 
effect a landing in any part O'f 
China accessible to vessels of 
mcditun d1•aught and its l'adius c.f 
adion would b~ limited only · b..\' 
thf" p.mMem o·f transport. 'Dhere 
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is ha.rdly a G enera.l in the Chin-
ese forces who has even an ele-
mentary conception o£ modern 
strategy or tactics ; there is pmh-
ably not a single unit tha.t woulu 
offer effective resistanc'e to an oi-
fen ·ive supported by modern 
heavy and :field a.rtillery, a.ero-
planes, tanks, etc . caJ:ried out· b:v 
a force one-tenth to one-fifth o£ its 
own numerical strength . When, 
therefore, China's milit:u"y b~·ag­
garts, o·r half-baked students, talk 
o£ :fighting the Japanese, or the 
Reds, or any other well-equipperl 
foreign £oa·~.:e, anyone acquainted 
with the adua.l condition of 
Chiim's armies must find it dif-
ficult to repJ"ess a smile. An en-
gag-ement bch\·eon any of Ghina.'s 
pre,;enl-clay armies, and a really 
efficient militn;ry fo1··ce would re-
sult in the massacl'e o£ eveu"y unit 
that Jill not holt from t.he field as 
!loon as i.lte fighting began. 
As a factor in the maintenance 
of i1dernnl o1der the Chine~tJI 
armies are equally useles '· :F'or 
t.he most part th 'Y are the foment-
ers ·of disorcler rather than the 
guardialns o£ the puhlic. The 
Chine!'ie at·e naturally a peac aule 
race. If they were not. unusually 
lono·-su[eiing they would long ago 
hav~ risen against the militcny 
tymnny to which they have bePJt 
s~tl1jeded . As it is, tlie.y meekly 
Huhmit. tv, though they bit,terly re-
sent, the presence o£ i.J.'OO'}J in their 
midst1. Mutinie. and civil war 
haYe c•.aluj eel untold su.ffelring under 
tho llepublio, and have 1esult.ed 
in the de tructionJ of many millions 
0 £ dollars' wo!l:th of private pr()l-
perty. An unpaid and "tmcliscip-
liued soldiery is a constaJlt menace 
to public pe~ce, and affords a pro-
lific recruiting ground £o•r the 
bandit ho!I'des which :flourish 
throughout the 00111ntry, and 
against whom the troops--who in 
many ca es are actually in league 
with the bandits-give no protec-
tion. 
What China's armies co t the 
nation directly and indirectly, it 
is impossible :to est.imate. It must 
run into several hundred million8 
o£ dollars a year. For the armieo. 
absorb not only the bulk o£ the 
Pwvincial and National l'evem.ues, 
but the g1·eater part o£ every loan 
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which the Central Government 
co·ntri ve to raise fr m foreign or 
Chinese sources, and, with a few 
noteworthy exceptions, the troops 
li>e to a very lai·ge extent upon 
the communities among which they 
are quartered, either by open rob-
bery, cr iby compelling the inhabit-
anis to ac·cept de'J)'rec:La,ted pape•r 
eurrcncy at a fictitious value. 
1'he1·e is hardly a department of 
the administration into which the 
blight of milii arism has not pene-
trated. It is the direct cause of 
C'hina't; insolvell'cy, of the ruin oi 
her f::\tate railways and of the J. 'e-
c:rudeseenee uf t.he opium h1affio. 
It render~:~ the impartial aurl 
elfi.c.ieut auministration of the law 
impoosible. It is the c.:'tuse of the 
starvation of China'. ed~wationaJ 
imtitutions. It is re ponsible for 
constant friction between: the Cen-
tral Government a.nd the Treaty 
Powers. It interposes an insuper-
ruble obstacle to the realizaticlll of 
China's legitimate national as-
piiations. 
'l'l1e Delega.tes of the Gorvern-
ments n:p1·e~:~ented aL l '\\7~'1shington 
took so grave a Yiew of "the main-
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tenance in various parts of the 
c·ountry, of military force , exces. 
~iYe in number and controlled by 
the miliim:y chiefs ·01£ the Pro-
vinces withorut co-ordinati<•>n," 
thai they adopted a resoluhoo em 
bodying a serious wnming i.o the 
('hinese Government; and Sir 
Ho·ha.rt Borden, who explnined the 
aUilude of the sub-Committe.e 
which ch·afted this resolutioJl, stat-
ed i.1at. ''sJ lang a ihe military 
g-oYernors retained ihei1· present 
dominating autho·rity and in-
fluence, the provision of great re-
''eHues or the placing of largl) funds 
at tl1e dislJosal of a. weal: Admin-
istral ion, would p10brubly he 
absorbed io a very great extent by 
these military chiefs instead of be-
ing employed to cut do~ their 
power." Jt. was :Lhe Might od' mili-
tarism, therefore, which influenced 
the Delegates in rejecting China's 
reque,c;t for •rariff Alllrtonomy, und 
in imposiDig I'estrictions on any 
mmease in i..he existing Import 
'ral'it!. Various proposals for dis-
LandmP,nt have been put forward, 
mo. t otf which are impracticable 
be(!uu~e they depend fo•r fulfilment 
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upon a huge financial outlay, and 
upon the loyn 1 co-operation of 
Militarists who have hown very 
clearly by their rl'!cent actions that 
they harve not the slightest inten-
tion of reducing .thei1' foi'Ces. No 
scheme for the disbandment or£ 
two ... thil·ds of the present armed 
fome · whi h would leiave China 
with ample troops for all her re-
asonable requiremenf.s.--has yet 
· been devised which has the re-
n1Jotest prospec.t of succeeding. 
Tuchunism remains the crux of 
the Ohinese pi'ohlem, and at tha 
moment it seems to be a problem 
for which no real olutioDJ c.a.n be 
found. 
v. 
PUBLIO JUSTICIE. 
NO time need be wasted in dit;-
cus.sing the Chine e Navy, for 
it cannot. be considered a serious• 
factor in the Far E,as.tern situa-
tion.. Tlh.e Chinese sailor, well-
trained, ma;y b:e an exceUent sea-
man, but in these da.ys of Super-
Dieadnoughts, suhmarine+s, and 
long~ range guns and' torpedoes, 
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the Qhinese Navy would be useless 
for offence or deience . It contains 
no vessel largeT than a [ight crui -
ser and even i:f it could be con-
cen'tr.arted, a:n,d do·uld secure suf-
ficient coal--on credit-to put to 
sea the whole fleet coulrl be taken 
on 'by one modern battleship or 
battle-cruiser. We turn, therefore, 
to our next subject, the adminis-
tration of public: justice! in· this 
country. At li.:n, early stage in 
China's :foreign r•elations the West-
ern Powei'S realized tha.t li:fe would 
be intolei"able for their &UJhject~ 
who resided in, or tradelcl with, 
China, if they wen~ subject to 
Chinese jUl'isdictio•n. They there-
fore adopted in Ohina the system 
which had previously been a.dopt-
ed iQ other non-Christian na.tions 
-the system of ~xtra.territol'i a l 
jurisdiction. This system admif·-
tedly has numerous· drawback . a1Hl 
constitutes an infrinO'ement of the 
sovereignty of the country in 
which it is enforced. It has tr(}m 
!ime ~o time boon grossily abused 
m Q:hma, chiefly by some of the 
Latm States with oompaJ'atively 
small interests in this country. 
32· 
But· it w s. the only pr:alctical al, 
tern:.ttive to the , ubjection of for-
eigner'. to the binese tribunals, 
with theili barbarous punislnnents, 
wholesale con"Uption, a.n,d alien 
theories of jurisprudence. 
'Dhe impact of Western influ-
ence on the East, n,ncl i.he growing 
national consciousness of the Chin-
ese, n,aturally led to a desire to 
exercise• the full r~ghts of so.ver-
eignty, and in the British, Amt>T-
ican and . J apa:nese Commercial 
Treaties of 1902-3 the Porwers con-
cernecl agreed i.o assist China in 
the reform of her judicial sysi.em, 
and to r linquish their extrater-
rito·rial rig·his when satisfied "tbnt 
the state of the CJJ.inese b-ws, the 
a.I"''angements for their administra-
tion, and other conside1%tions' · 
wananted them in so doing. At 
Ver ailles, and again at \iVa h-
ington, the .hinese Dele""at.es at-
tempted to penma.de the GOIVern-
lnents of the Treaty Po\YCTS to re-
linquish their extra-teiTitorial 
rights within a. fixed period-by 
the end of 1924 at Versailles; at 
a da.te to be agreed up0n at Wash-
ington. 
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No'v in discussing this q1mst.io·n 
it io> neces ary briefly, and in 
simple. lang·uage, to consider exact-
ly wbal pTivileges are confeneLl 
upon foreigners who are protected 
bv Consular Jurisdiction. 'HH.!Y 
ai'·e, in ihe fil',·:t plaee, amena.blc 
only lo their own judicial or con-
sulai' authol'itieo:: w·heu accused ot 
any criminal otl:encc, or a~Jpew·ing 
as de£endan s in any civil suib. 
They w·e subject to the laws nt 
their own nation, except in w far 
aH they may be modified by sper:-
ial le~·islatiun, it~ surh mai,te.rs as 
marriage, divo1·ce, p1obate, and 
('Ompany inc011}0ration. They ran-
uot be compelled to pay any kind 
o£ taxation impose,d by the Chin-
ese Central or Provincial Govenl-
ments, without the apprQIVal o:f 
their home govemmcnts. Obvious-
ly thPse priYileges operate in de-
rogation o:£ China's sovereci.gnty. 
and can be justified on1y i£ very 
strong reas(}ns r:an be adduced 
therefor. China's official spokes-
men arg·ue iha.t these reasons no 
longer exist; that codes ba.scd upon 
lllodern \Veslern prndice have now 
beeu compiled :mel promulgated; 
34 
and that pl"operly tl"ained judges 
are a.va.ilable fo·r the trial of civil 
and criminal cases in which for-
elgnei are de£endaiDt \ 
It is tnw tha.t a whole ser:ie,g of 
codes haYe been compiled and pro-
mu!Lga.ted, ·with the aid <>f Con-
tinE-ntal and Japanese experts, and 
b.a ed la:rgely up<>n the Na.pole<>nic 
Oode--which in many rr,spects is 
entirely irreconcilable with Anglo-
Saxon jmisporudence. It is true, 
too, th~.t a ~erta.in number of mo-
dern-ti·ained Chinese a1'e se·rvi11g 
a~ Judges and Promu·a.tors in the 
Supreme C'ourt, and BO'lil.e o£ the 
higher J?ro·vincial T1'ibunals. But 
it i~ not irue that China is yet 
withill measurable distance o£ the 
clay when "the state of the. Chin-
ese laws" and the "arrangements 
£or the•ir administration" would 
warrant . the relinquishment' of 
Consula.r jurisdiction. The with-
drawal of Goll~ular pro·tection 
would, in our opinion, be waJ.·Tant-
ecl <>nly when C.hina could pro-
duce indisputal>le proofs o£ the 
supremacy <>£ the la.w, and the im-
partial administrati<>n oJ justice, 
throughout the country. A few 
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specially orgal\ized Courts for 
h'a111dling :foreign ca es, even if 
they were efficient to begin with, 
would soon deteriorate toward the 
general level o{ the adminisb:ation 
of public ju.s•tice throughout the 
country. And that level is almost 
incredibly low. The Ruspension o£ 
Ru.ssian Consular jurisdiction in 
Ma.nelnnia. ha& revealed what for-
eigners might expect to suffer if 
ihey were once placed unre ervedl y 
at the mercy o£ the Chinese 
authoriiies. "'1/{e need no·t here re-
1er in deta.il to the exiJ.•aordinary 
incompetence disp~ ayed by the 
GhineHe judiciary in M :mch1U"ia, 
numbers exam11les o£ which were 
given in the China Year Book, 
19~1-2. Nor need we elwell upon 
the erratic and exorbitant 
taxation imposed upon the 
RuSfliam~ by the local Chinese 
authorities in the Chinese 
Basiern Railway Zone, which is 
mentioned in the cmTent issue of 
the' same publieation. Tlht; t.ltJnt-
men,t n£ the Russians in Man-
clnlTia is a conclu::~ive exposm'e of 
the unfitness of the C:hinese 
judiciall-y to a.;;sume power over the 
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lives, liberties, anu prol erty' o.f 
foreigners .. 
Vile approach the subject, tht re-
fore, :from another n ngle. No real-
ly enlightened Ohinesfll can seriously 
expec,t the Foi'eign GovernmE·nts 
concerned to surrenuer this ]e:ll-
ously guarded p1ivilege of I'X-
tratenitoriality on i·he me1e f;llp-
po·ition that ali will be well. 'l'he 
:B'oreign Governments ~M·e entitlt->ol, 
before• giving serious consideratiou 
to China's request, io• sati~fy illem-
selves that Uhinese law is ~:-,tis­
factorily administered over 111e 
citizen of tiLe C:hinefle n .epuhlil'. 
'rhey cannot be e.·pected 1o j ~ga.1·d 
their nationals as fitting· mbj••ets 
for experiment where the Chinese 
judiciary is concer-ned. And when 
this te t is applied, China's w!·.ole 
ca.se .for abolition collap~es. 'I.'1he 
law, hke other branche:-; of the ad-
minislmtion• of the Tiep11iblie, is 
governed hy force :mJ by ex-
pediency. The most prominc11t 
Chine ·e citizens-aH has been 
shown m the caRe oi Mr. Lo \Veu-
kan, who until De(;ember, 192~ 
wa.· MiHister o£ l:finance-can be 
illegally arr·ested, and ubseqll-ent-
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Qy imprisoned for month.s on end, 
without any charges bemg fGrm-
ula.ted or any pretence of trial, 
merel; iG gratify the spite o·t 
their political enemies . A Turhun 
-a'S the execution of Mr. Rhih 
Yang, a lawyer wlw hn<l identifteil. 
bimsel f with the rrrent agitation. 
among t hP railwaymmt, showul--
('an h'avtl a ('him•se cilizen Hhoi out, 
of hand, and then have the ad-
ditional eft' ron tery to pretend that 
it wa;; do11e uuder an article in the 
Criminal Code 'Vhich prescribes a. 
maximum JJ Cnaliy o{ fwr y'l:'ars' im-
pri . onment or a. fine1 of $300 for 
the offence .allegetl. 'frnffic i11 or 
the consumption of opium, an<l 
gambling are otfenees •tmlel' th~:­
Crim_inal Onde . There is hardly a 
Tuchun who is not openly engaged 
in tha opium trnfflc, and who does 
11ot encourage and protect his sub-
ordinates in t.be viola.tion of the 
011ium lawf!. A R;u.c;siml Captain in 
whose cahin a qua.nlit.y of opium 
was discovered, at Ohefoo, was re-
moved hom his ship, ancl senten-
ced to two years imprisonment, 
n~cenily . Yet if the law were im-
part.ially ndrniui:ie•red nearly 
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every Tuchun, and a very large 
percentage oi hi· subordinate. 
\'ioulrl be "doi11g' time." Similar-
ly, with gambling. Nearly every 
('.h inese' po,litic,ian is kno,wn to 
gamble for large ~takes, in public 
J est::nuants. 'l'hc Speaker of the 
Honse of Representatives was re-
cently re>~pon~ible for an unseemly 
hra ,Yl , while plnying ?nah-jong in 
n PPking JI tel. 'J'he propri tor 
was compell ed by the police to 
apO>logize to him for being assaul-
ted, and fo lutving his furniture 
smashed up. 'o action wliat;;o-
eve'l' wa.c:;. take11 again . t ihe S-peaker 
eithe:~• for violenre or' fot' ga.m-
hling. Yet the Peking Ortroi 
will seize and confiseate mah-.ionrJ 
sets destined for a forrign Club, 
on the ground ihnt?nah-jong is .nn 
illrrgal ga.m1Jlling game. 
The C01ine. e judiciary would 
dearly love to ex rei e ihei1 auth-
ority over foreign erf: generally, 
and it would fa,l ill with thoRe 
whose interests were not caretfullv 
watched by their Consuls, O<r whos~ 
Comu1. · ha.d no·t. the means to· bark 
up their dema1Hl1> fm· ju. tire. The 
~urrender of Oonsular Jurisdiction 
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under existing eouditions would 
parnly~e trade_, drive _:ma.IJ~ o£ tl1o 
mo~:t. ~mb~l.aniwl foreign, wiere t8 
out o:f the country, and opemte 
f.olely in favo•ur o£ any unscrupu-
lous· fo•reigners familiar ·with, and 
willing to pander to , C[Jinese col·-
nqdiou. Justice, in the~ ordin-
arily aeeepted ense o£ t.he word, i · 
unobtainable in himt while the 
present admini ·tr.a tive h.aos pr -
vails . In the opinion o£ Mr. 13. 
Leno·x Simpson, Adviser to the 
President.' , OffiP.e, the ra.i singof the 
question of aboliRhing· exh'ater-
rilol 'ialily, at \Va.-:hing-t.on, "wiih 
th result o·£ the appointment of 
an lnlernationnl Commission to 
investigate that matter" was "a 
serious blunder. The Commis-
sion," he added, "will certainly 
investigate the administration o£ 
justice and the treatment o:£ 
Rus ·ian , in Manchuria., whieh 
may do China serious harm j£ the 
Commission' report is publishecl, 
as the present position leaves much 
to be desi.rrd and a lar•ge number 
of per. ons are waiting to give dam-
aging evidence." The only thing 
to be said IO!I.' raisin"' i.he que tion 
0 ' 
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in our opm10n, is this: tLat. if the· 
Gomruission does meet and publish 
its report, the douche of eold truth 
ma.y repress some of the conceit 
and self-satisfadion i~ evidenctll m 
i.hose circles which take the v 1ew 
that. China has only i.o make en-
ough noise about a.uyUung to bmn-
boo~le the 'l'l'eaiy 1>owe1-::~, and to 
get her own way. 
VI. 
EDUCATION. 
THE Uan~hu!!!, in 1908, adopted 
a ddini le programme of Gon-
stitulioual dovelopment which pr().. 
vided, a.mo11g nther things, for the 
systematic expansion of edJUication-
al facilities of all gra.des through-
out the Chine e Empire. The 
nine year's programme, which was 
to ble put in Lo force between J 909 
and 1917 waR arranged in the ex-
pectation that at the end of thE~ 
period five per cen.L .of the popula-
tion would l:e ahle to read and 
write. Statistics published for the 
yea•r 1910 (Lhe first year o£ H. M. 
Rsuan 'l'ung) ho·wed tba.t there 
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wc1e altogether 57 ,2G7 Govern· 
ment Universities, college$ anll 
schools of different gra.lles, with a 
total number of students o£ 1,626,· 
f>29, and 89,362 teacher,s. Owing 
to the prevailing chaos througlwut 
China tJlre ~Iinistry of Educatio~, 
has l·een Ul£13 ble to publish a.ny 
stati.stirs since 1917, and those for 
that yea.r were incomplete, no re-
turns having been received from 
HzC'{~huan, Kweicht,w, or Kwangsi. 
In that ye:u the number of schools 
was :.:·iven aa 121,119, the numbel' 
of Rtu,dents as 3,914,454, and th£~ 
numLer of teachers as 129,221. 
This inerease, iu view o£ the mis· 
appropriation of J?r·o·vincial and 
Na.tiona,l revenues by the militar-
isLs, and the <hie lplessneiSS of the 
Central Government, must 1be con-
~idered rather remarkable. It is. to 
he feared that in the intervening 
five yea1·s it has not been ruailli-
tnined. 
'rhere is, unque. tionably, a 
thirst :£01r knowledge, however 
superficial, amo<ng- upiper• and 
middle-class (;hinese-a thirst 
which it is becoming more and 
rnore difficult to grat·ify owing 
the financial difficult.ies o£ the Go·v-
ernmeut.. l)rofessors and teachers 
of Govel11lillle•nt institutions have 
had to do without their pay for 
months ou end, and a.t time. , ex-
asperated by the seeming indiffer-
ence o£ the Authorities, have coone 
out on strike to compel attention 
to their grievances. ]~ven, how-
ever, when the Government has 
clefinitely ea~mark.ed certain re-
venues for educa.tional expenses, it 
has seldom been :tble to keep its 
pledges. And numerous Govern-
ment cducntioiJlnl institutioos still 
mainia~n a preca.rious existence on 
this aCCO!UIDt. 
'l'he um·est among the unpaid 
teachers is natural. But o£ recem,iJ 
years we ha,ve< witnessed a.nother 
phenooncnon, in the form o£ in-
creasing insurl:ordina.tion among 
the student . Every national sy':!.-
tem of educa.tion must depellld for 
its efficicucy mainly upton the 
&trict enforceme.nt o£ discipline, 
especia.Uy in the lower grades of 
schoo1 . :More latitude i usually 
nllrm·ecl in Universities, but he1e 
also the authority o£ the Govern-
ing l:ody or the staff is pammount 
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in snch matters as the nature o£ 
the currie-dunn, the standard re-
quired for succ.ess at eiXa.minatiJoiils, 
and the gffileral conduct of the 
siudeuts during te·rm-time. In 
Ghina we have seen students object 
to the curriculum, refuse i.o take 
il1e examinations required f.o.r 
Rpr<'ific: degree!' or certific.a.te , 
defy aml maltrea.t their professors 
and teachers, and absent them-
selves at their own sweet will, 
whonevcr they desire to participatfl 
in political and other demonstra-
iionR. We do•nht whether then~ 
are more than two Government in-
stit.ui.ions o£ any standing, in 
('hina., where any serious a.ttempt 
is marle to enforce discipline, and 
where it is made1 a C()ndition o£ 
admission t.ha.t &tudents shall re-
frain, during enrolment, from par-
iir.ipation in any political demcxn-
strations. 
The siudents o£ China have got 
completely out. of hand during the 
past four or fiv\~ year'S, and it is to 
he regretted that insubordination 
is almost as rife in foreign-
coni rollPfl (chiefly Missionary) 
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institutions, M m Government 
schools and GoUeges. Before 
they have reaehed the age o·f dis-
crliltion, before they can possibly 
have acquired the experienc~ 
necessary to qualify them as com-
petent jurlges on matters of 
11alional and even iuteTnational 
im1,·ortance, simle11tR o£ all ages 
and holh sexes will foiJ.·sake their 
studies, sometimes for days on 
end, to take p:ut in anti-foreig11 
or anti-Governm€nt street proces-
sions and other demonstrations, 
which have not iufr'equently end-
eel in i he desi.J·uction of privattl 
and public property, the kidnap-
ping o£, m' a.'lsau.lts u.po·11 r putahle 
citizens, and the wholesale in-
timidation o£ the merchant olasses. 
It is a pitiful spectacle-the more 
pitiful because China is tradi-
tionally a country when~ old age 
is treated with respect, aud 
paterna[ authority is supreme. 
'JThe younger generation o•f China, 
headstrong, ill-informed, and im-
patient o£ any form of discipline 
is an important £ador in the pre-
vailing chaos, And although the • 
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militarists a1·e int<>lerant of any 
r.haUenge to their own authority 
· hy the student class, they not ooly 
c·;mnive at, hut a.ctu.ally instigate, 
anti-foreign and other demonstra-
iions which do not tend to WJder-
mine their own pretPnRions. 
It is raiher late in ihe day now 
to aHempL to ecover cmdrol o£ 
hina's student&. The Go·vcru-
ment Juts not the prestige or the 
authority necessary to restore di:;-
eipline. The Missionary institu-
lion:'l awoke too late to the COJJ-
Hequenres of the firf-11 act.~ of in-
snl,nrilinaiion, and Reem fearfu l , 
today, o£ clraHtic ac lion for the 
restoration of orclcr, lest they 
should [ose a large percentage o-f 
their pupils. But. it. seems to m 
that. this is a problem in the solu ·· 
I ion of which they oug·ht at least 
to. aitempt to lead the way. TlJcy 
m1ght fiU[er, by the loss o£ many 
of their students in the first in-
stance. But they raier to• a. O'row-
• 0 
mg need, which the Government 
institutions are incapable, for 
financial and poliiical reasons of 
. . ' 
:p1eetmg, and 1£ they were to act 
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with unanimity and firmness it 
would not, we think, be long he- . 
fore they could obtain all the 
pupils they CQUld poo i.My teach, 
under guarantees which wouVl 
preclude auy wholesale insub-
ordination, or political activity. 
Before iih.lere can be any hope of 
real improvement in the discipline 
of Government educational in-
stitutions, drastic changes will be 
necessary in connection with the 
teaching stafl, especially in the 
Universities. One can hardly ex-
pect students who witness the 
nauseat~n1g spectacle o£ their pro, 
fessors' ti01a.dyi11g :to1, and fnater-
n:izing with a notorious Bolshevik 
agent, to lE-arn respect for 
authority, or obedience to orders. 
&-.holars like the Hon. Bertrand 
Rus. el, with their ultra-radical 
and unorthodox views ma.y do n£1 
!hi:nm among intelligent British 
audiences. They are not of the 
type likely to benefit the rising 
generation ·in China, already fa.r 
too readily inclined to adopt any 
bi7.arre theories or philosophies, 
however impractica-ble and id~ 
4i 
listie. 'l'he root ca.use of China's 
presont difticulties is the attempt 
t.o graft on to an ancient but 
politically ha.ckwa.rd State a system 
of governmetnrt fitted only £or an 
advanced democracy. Ghina was 
not ready for republican Govern-
m.ent in 1912. She is not ready 
for it. to-day. And the taaching of 
extreme radic.:'tlism to the rising 
generaii01l1 is calculated to widen 
the bwach between tillling-s as they 
are, rund things as certain idealists 
''"ould like them to b~. 'l'he pm-
<'ess o£ political evolution cannot 
})'(' aeceletated be:yond certain 
limits in a va,st. oountcy where the 
masses are so bac.kward politically, 
a,; the G'hina of ta-day. And the 
last thing to be desired is that the 
higher institutions o£ learning 
should turn ourt students who can 
talk •n10 end o£ claptrap a,l:;out 
sociaJlism, and capitalism com-
. ' mumsm and free-loNe, witho.ut 
even an elementary understanding 
of the fundamental problems 
which must be soJvad before 
China can takt1 her plac.e on an 
equal footing, among the great 
'!lations o£ the earth. 
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VII. 
C011l·)I lJNIOA'l'ION, 
']_"lHE development of communica-
tions in China has bet'ln 
sel'iou ly hn.m pe1 d by administra--
tive i11efil\'il'·JH;y, and military in-
terference, under the Republic, 
especially during i.he pa t few 
years. Hailwn.y construction has 
virtlu:ally come io a standstill. 
ExistL.n,g railways :ue rapidly de-
tm·iora.ting, owing to the mis-
appl'G~Jriai.ion of revenues 1Yy the 
militari ,· t .. " 7i rele s communica-
1 ions, in regard to which Oh~un. 
might well have benefited frOiiil :the 
experienre of :foreign Power , hav1~ 
beicome a subject of internat ional 
discord, owing to the confl.ictill1g 
conces ions which have been gta.nt-
ed to floreign c mpauies by dif-
ferent depa.rtment of the Chinese 
Government. A monopoly of long-
distance 'rireless communication 
was gramted to a. J npanese ooncern 
by an agreement signed by the 
MiniEtry of Navy in Feibruary, 
1918. U'eo.'lnin preferential wire-
less 1ights were granted to the 
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British .Marconi Compa.ny by an 
agrN'm<'nt fligned by theJ :Ministry 
of War in August 1918, a.nd OOID-
fi.nned in a sec nd agreement sign-
Pd on l\Iay 24, 1919. Both of 
these agreements were viola,ted by 
n contract signed with the 
Am<'ricun Federal Wireless Tele-
f!l nph and Telephone CorporatiQ1n 
bv the Ministry of Communica-
tions, on .TanuaJ.-y 8, 1921. The 
project of deve1crping aerial com-
munication in ·China has e.nded in 
a complete fiasco, owing to the 
i'Pir.nrf' hy the Chibli a.nd Mukden 
militarists, in violatiom. of the 
IPrms of ilw agreements with the 
Vi.:kf'rs :mel liamlley-Page Chm-
pnn i CR, of a num l) f'l' of ihe aircraft 
impolicd hv Hw Government. 
Th<' con,diticlll of the C'hinese 
ltoYel'nnwnt railway , to-day, is 
rrilif'nl. 'Prndicallv tl1e lrt t con-
structive art of t11~ :Manchus in 
1911 wa'< ihe sig"JJatme of the Hu-
kuang· Railway Loan G\mtract with 
the li'OOJil'-Power Group, prvaviding · 
fnr the completion of the Oanton-
ITan kc"'-' P..nilway, and the oorn-
Rtrnriion of the Rzcchuan-Hankow 
line. To rrive effect, to this agree-
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manit it was necessary to na,tion-
alize all trunk railways, and it was 
the opposit.io·n o£ the Szechuanese 
to this action w hic.h led to a revolt 
in Western China, and ultimately, 
to the First Revolution. When 
the Manchus were compelled to 
abdicate there were· approximately 
5,822 miles of ra.ilways, opera.ted 
by the State, by F 'oreign Oonces-
sionaires, or hy Provinc.ia.l Oom-
pa.nies, ~n China and M·anchuria. 
To-day, more than · eleve•n years 
later, the tota.l ha.~ risen only to 
1,173 miles ; in o.ther wo·rds, only 
1,353 miles of railway have been 
c'ICmpletecl under the R.epublic, or 
an a.verage o.f 123 miles per annum. 
THs, of course, is a ridiculous 
fig-ure in a country with an area 
of over 4,27FI,OOO sq,ua.re miles, 
with a.n e.stimated population of 
n<eaJ:ly 430,000,000, a.nd entirely 
devoid of roads. China reqllllires, 
and unde•r honest and efficient ad-
ministration wo'Ulcl derive immense 
:fina,ncial ' profit from, many thou-
sands o£ miles o£ railway, linking 
up the We te'rn and N orth-westeun 
provinces with the Y a.ngtze or the 
coast, estrublishing direct com-
munieation by rail between Peking 
and O:m ton, and rendoo:ing acces-
sible to world commer100 the 
imme·nse na tum] resources o£ pro-
Y:imces like Szechuan, Kwan,gsi, 
Kweichow, Shensi, Kansu, and 
Rinkiang, which a1'e at present en-
i.imly without railway oommunica-
tion. Obhier provinces, such as 
Fukien, C'hekiang- a.nd Kiangsi are 
·virtually isolated. 
A properly run railway is one 
o£ the most remunera.tive UiLider-
takings in China. '.Dhe ratio of 
expenditure or I'~Netntule o£ the 
Peking-Mukden Railway used .to 
be weU below thirty per cent\. As 
recently as 1920 it was only 38.75 
per cent. And tJ:J.e surplus o£ the 
Govetr.'ll.Illent railways fo!r tbt year 
ammmted to more than $40,000,-
000. Jm, 1921 the SUII'plus had 
fallen to $27,361,000. Since then 
the Pelring-Hankow Railway, 
which, in 1920, had a surplus of 
rubout $15,000,000 has been seized 
hy General Wu Pei-fu an,d operat.-
ed £'0!1." ihci.s p&sonal benefit. 'rhe 
Peking-~M:ukden Line ha,s been 
split iby General Ohang Tso-lin, 
who has can-ied off a large po!l'tion 
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or the rolling stork outsid the 
G1·eat ·w n ll, aJHl operat-es the Shan-
ha.ikuan-1\'Iukden , eclion ent.ireiy 
independently of lhe C~ntral Gov-
emment. 0£ the C'antomi-HankOIW 
Railway (700 miles) more than 100 
of which were completed in 1911, 
only 450 miles in ull have beeu 
con~tru ted up to date , leaving a 
gap o£ 250 mil s in lhe middle and 
llto,o.; t d ifllouilt. ·e lion. On the 
Northern (W uciliang-Changsha) 
scctio\111 the permanent way and 
rolling stock hu,ve deteriorated to 
such an extent that it is now con-
sidel'ed un afe lo run t.mins at a 
higher peed than eight m·iles per. 
ho It?" over portion o£ :the line:.. 
Cooshuction ()£ the Szechuan-
Hankow TI.ailway has ootirely 
cea ·ed, and •uot ()ne kilometre of 
the line is working. The Southern 
section of the anton-Hankow 
Rail way still being in the hands o£ 
a provincial CIOIIllpany, all that 
China has to show foT a Loan of 
~ix millions t.erliug being some two 
hundred miles o£ pe!l'manent way 
in such an appalling condition 
i.ha.t, as the Ghairman o£ the Han-
kow British Ohamber of ComJillei'Ce 
put .it only a few days ago, "we 
are in meusumble distance or£ a 
complete stoppage." 
The Government railways, ow-
ing to militar·y depredations and 
int.edert!nce a.re all on the verge of 
i"ui.n. '1'1H!•y are unable to do more 
~ than meet actual working ex-
penses, little or no money being 
available for repairs, maintenance, 
o·I' additions to roBing-stock. 
Money eannarked :for necessary 
railway undertakings, such as, the 
reconstnwtion o£ the Yellow 
River B,ridge ou the I eking-
Hanko·w Line, is EJhaJUelessly mis-
appropriatea fo1' 11olitical or mili-
tary use. 'l'he pl1g·ht of the Pro-
vincial Railways is equally unsatis-
factory. The Kiangsi Rail way i · 
on the verge of bankrupt y, show-
ing a heavy annual deficit, and 
getting mol'e deeply into debt every 
year with its Japane. e creditors. 
The Kwangtung section o£ the 
Oanton-Hankow Line has 11,ot been 
erx.tended any further Northward 
:for years, and i!! losing heavily.· 
Tlhe Swatow-Ghaochoufu Rail-
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way has never paid its way, · anc1 
is unlikely to do so in the· near 
future. Indeed the only paying 
provincial line i.P' the Sunning 
Railway, which had a surplus of 
a little over $115,000 in 1921. The 
only railways which are really on 
a ound financial basis to~day are 
the -two foreign-owned ()once sions 
-the South Manchuria. and the 
Yunnan Railways. 
How. grave the financial situa-
tion of the Chinese Government 
railways is was revealed in a series 
of resolutions adopted by the Amer-
ican Ohamber of Commerce a.t Pe-
king," at the end of last month. 
Theo figures given therein show 
that instead o£ paying thei1• loan 
obligations and deb~ fo~ materials 
an,d equipment, and yielding a 
substantial annual sUiplus to the 
Governments. the Government 
Railways and telegraphs shOIW a;n. 
annual deficit ou Loan servicetl 
alo!D.e {)£ $14,400,000 without mak-
ing a.ny provision whatsoever for 
· t:b.e payment of unsecured indebted-
ness amounting to $108,800,000. 
No re.putable foreign firmswillcon-
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tinue to supply materials~ to the 
Government raitlways, on credit, 
·under present conditions, and it 
seems to he merely a question o1 
time until some o£ the main lines 
either hreak down, or find' it neces-
o.ary g-reatly tO> reduce theil' pas-
senger and goods services, owing 
to the dei.erioration of the per--
manent way and ro:lling-stock. J t 
is believed that immense damage 
has already been done . to the lo-
comotives and rolling-stock cal'-
ried off by Chang Tso-lin during 
his invasion o·f Chihli last yt>ar 
fo·r there are no fa.ci[ities for re-
pairs and maintenance outside the 
wall. The Chinese object to any 
form o£ foreign supervision or con-
trol on their State Railways. A 
comparison between Ghinese-
operatecl lines, and those operated 
under foreign control should con-
vince any impartial observer that 
some fo'l"m. of foreign supervision, 
coupled with the complete elimina-
tion of military interference, con-
stitutes the sole meanS/ hy which 
the Ohinese railway system can be 
saved from absotlute disaster. 
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VIII. 
FINANCE. 
T HE Tzuchengyuan, or National 
Council, whieh met for the 
first time in October, 1910, pre-
pared a Budget for 1911, which 
estimated the income of the ·cen-
tral Government at Kuping Tls. 
301,910,296, and the total na.tional 
eoxpenditure (including T~s. 77,-
915,890 for the Army) at Tis. 
298,448,365, Qeaving a sm·plus ot 
of Tls. 3,461,931. In October la t. 
the late Mini ter of Finance pub-
lished a statement sho•wing that 
lhe expenditure of the. Central 
Government was more than $108,-
000,000 per annum (o£ which 
$55,216,462 wa,~ required for the 
payment o£ units under the Min-
isuy of. War, and the Chihli 
troop ) and that the annual re-
venue of the Central Government 
was $2,772,000 per annum, lea\'-
ing a deficit of over $105,000,000. 
In the expenditure given above 
no account was taken of Ohina's 
obligations in connection with for-
eign and domestic loans, ra.ilway 
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or telegraph loans, etc., and t.he 
military exependiture was c.onfin-
e.cl to: fourteen Divisions and six-
teen, tQ eighteen Mixed Brigades, 
or at most 350,000 out of the 
1,332,000 men under anns 
throughout the country. In 
.December 1911 China's foreign in-
debtedness including railway 
loans, but exclusive of a few smaU 
private loans wa& £138,998,861, or 
approximately $1,590,000,000. In 
September last China's fo·reign 
and internal debts, exclu ive of 
those contracted by the Ministry 
o£ Communications, were e timat-
ed to amount to $1,726,400,000. 
To this must be added approxim-
ately 540,000,000 representing 
railway an,d telegnph loans, and 
unsecured indebtedness' for mater-
ial, bringing the total up i.o about 
$2,265,000,000, an increru e in 
the nation's total iude,btedness in 
eleven years o£ over $660,000,000. 
This, at first sight does not seem 
excessive. But it must •be em-
phasized that since 1911 the en-
tire Germa.n and Austrian out-
standing portion o£ the Boxer 
Indemnity, amounting at the date 
, 
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o£ cancellati<m to about $'217 ,000,-
000, has been cancelled, and that 
in addition., since 1911, Ohina has 
reduced her pre-R.epubllican in-
debtedness by a.pp!'o!Ximately 
$500,000,000. At a conservative 
estimate, therdo,re, without taking 
into account repayments of or on 
aooount o£ short and long-term 
loans contracted under the Repub-
lic, the Republican Government 
has increased C.hina.'s national in-
debtedness by over 1,300,000,000. 
As a mat.t.er of £act of the $1,726,-
400,000 which wa the figure give11 
by the Minister of Finance of 
China's foreign and domestic in-
debtedness., exclu ive or£ l 'ailway 
and telegraph loans, in setpem-
beT last, more than $953,800,000 
had been contracted under the Re-
p11blic. 
Judged by Europ an sta_ndards 
a na-tional debt of ahout £'285,-
000,000 would not be considered 
serious · for a country of the size, 
and possessed of the immense Ie-
sources, of China. Under efficient 
administration there would ihe no 
difficulty in meeting alii cilarges 
upon this-and indeed upOn a 
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considerably gi'eater-indebted-
ness. It is difficult, however, io 
see how even a bs5inning is to be 
made with the necessary financial 
reforms. The- OustomSI revenue::. 
are pledged for indemnity pa.v-
ments and for the service of a 
limited number of domeslic loan . 
Such o£ the Salt Revenue as a1e 
not appropriated by the militari~; ts 
and provincjal a·utthoritie h'a.ve been 
pledged over and over again to 
tide the Oentral Government over 
periodical financial crises. Tlbc 
Central GGvernment receive~ 
practically nothing from the Land 
Tax, Likin, vVine and Tobacco 
~axes' , and railway revenues. Yet 
with an income of $231,000 pei· 
month it is expected to find more 
than $4,500,000 per month for 
miQitary expenses alone, and if :it 
succeed in borrowing even a few 
million dollars to carry it over a 
New Year or other festival, tl1P 
militarists commandeer the lion's 
share. Even the metropolitan 
police, on whose loyalty the main-
tenance o:f order in the Oapital de-
pends, have to work month after 
month without I'eceiving their pay, 
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and have I'ecently been consider-
ing going round, cap in l1and, to 
beg £rom the Peking populn.liou. 
Funds cannot be found for the 
Chinese Legations and Consulalt>s 
abro<::td, and it is not unusual fo1 
a high Chinese offwial, pmc:eed-
ing on some foreign mi ·sion io 
have to go to the Inspector-Gen-
eral o£ ustoms or the As ociute 
Ins-pector General of the Sa~t Ad-
ministration, to borrow, on the 
G-overnment's accnunt, the com-
paratively small sum necessary for 
his travelling expen es. 
The tragedy of the situation is 
that the reckless borrowing undt>•' 
the Republican regime, for which 
the nation will eventually have io 
£oot the bill, has brought no bene-
fit to the country at large. The 
money has been pent as reokle ·s-
ly as it has been borro·wed. Of-
ficials who have held offi.~ in Pe-
king for a few months, or even 
a few weeks, and have had their 
fing-e•ts in some lo•an deai , shame-
lessly flaunt their ill-gotten weal th 
in the eyes of the•ii' countrymen. 
One can imagine no pa:eca.utio.ns · 
at the momcmt. which could con· 
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.ceivuhly ·prove effec.tive in ensur-
ing tha,t any money lent .t01 China 
would he used e:xclus.ively for the 
reorganiza.tio•n of her finances•. 
M. Padoux, one of the Govern-
meinrts' Foreign AdviserS!, has pro-
duced a scheme fo.r the consolida-
tiOin o,£ Ohina's indelbrtednenss, 
,railway obliga,tions e:xclrucled, by 
ihe uo>e o·:f the Oustoms surplus, 
including the additional yield 
.anticipated from the projected 2! 
pel1 c.ent. surta.:x'. His scheme has 
evoked a strung protest fr'om the 
1\.merican Ohambe1r of Oommerc.e in 
Peking on the gmulnld tha,t ili 
ignores iJhe obligations .orf the Min-
istry of Communications. Doubt-
less Ohina's l'ailway debts could 
also be oonsolidated and placed 
up~m a thoroughly sorund basis, i:f 
the railways wm.·e to c.mue~ under 
effe1otive fweign supervision, and 
all •militaJ."V interferetnlce were eli-
minated. ·But any scheme· which 
prlcwides £or  the payment of Clhina's 
fm•eign and domestic (incl!uidingl 
rail way) obligations will merely; 
tom·ch the fringe o:£ he11.· financ.ial 
pl"'oblem. The Government must 
},J.a,ve revenue with which' to cany 
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on the rout~nte work of th a.dmin-
ist.ration. It will need really sub-
stantial sums tl::efore any seriou· ' 
attempt to reorganize the natiJonal 
finances can be undertaken. And 
if the Gustoons ruvenues were ear-
marked entirely for the payment 
o£ ('hi~a' s fo·r·e·ign and domesti ' 
debts , and the1 milwa.y revenuet. 
wer to be used, not for the upkeep 
orf th'e JHovinc.ial a1mies but solely 
for the disch.arr"ge o£ the obliga-
tions o£ the U~nistry otf Com-
munications, the militarists would 
naturally look elsewhere for the 
mea.ns to support themselves a.nd 
their forces. They appropria.ted 
more ilhian a third of th~ Salt re-
venues in 1922. They wcmild prob-
ably seize the remaining two-thirds 
if other sources werr··e out otff. We 
invariatbly come 1back to the plain 
fact that little or nothing can be 
achieved towards the rehabilitation 
of China, jn a.ny dii·ect.ion, a long 
as th~; Tu,·huns rema.in micontrol-
Jed !!lid uncontrollable. 
vV1he1n, if ever, the Special Con-
ference provided for under the 
·waRhington Tlreatie: t()i consider-
th conditions to be attaobled to the 
levy of the 2! per cent. surta.x: on 
G3 
the Impo·rt Duty, and plans for the 
abolition of likin, as embles, it is 
difficult to see how it can confine 
its discussi01n within the strict 
scope of the Oustoms Tariff Trea,ty. 
It will, it seems t01 us, be com-
pelled to go into the whole problem 
of Chinn.'s finance, and to make any 
recommendations which it has to 
offeo: for the fulfilment of the 
Treaty conditional upon dra tic in-
tf'rnn.l refOTms. Whether it will 
bf) able to apply sufficient moral or 
finamiCial pressure :to bring iJbJe mili-
tarists to iheir senses must, how-
ever, he c.on,·idered very doulbtful. 
'rhe 'l'uchun. seem to be absolutely 
indifff'rent I'eg-arding China's pres-
tige abroad. They care· nothing for 
her Treaty engagements, and less 
for the protests of. their own coun, 
trymP.n. The nm'ancial MocJmde 
which has been ma.intai1Jed hy the 
Consortium has so fal1' resulted only 
in iheir absorbing a. greater and 
greater shate of iJhle national 
revenues, regardless of the dif-
ficulties of the Clentral Go!Vem-
ment. And one ca.nnot suggest how 
that blockade can be raised with-
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out the certainty tha.t a latrge per· 
eentag-e of any moneys lent to 
China. for any purpose whatsoever 
will find its way, immediately, into 
ihe 'l'uchnus' pockert:s. 
IX 
OPIUM. 
CHINESE wTiters have been 
fond of citing the Anglo-
Chine8e Opium Agreements of 
1907 and 1911 as precedents for 
the abolition o:l1 extraten:ito1ia.lit.y. 
All that it i.s n ecessary to do, they 
say, is to put Q.hina upon her 
honour, and all will be well. One 
o£ the most brilliant of tlw 
younger Chinese diplomats , in a 
work published as recently as 19] 8 
-China's New Const1'ttttion. anrf 
International P1·oulems, by M. •r. 
Z. Tyau - argue:s· that putting the 
Chinese on their honour to fulfil 
their obligations in rega.rd to the 
abolition of extrater1itoriality, 
would furni ·h the Ghinese people 
with a powerful in pirat.ion. He 
quotes with app.rorval , the vierws of 
the late Sir Robert Hart, that j£ 
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China "so to speak" were placed 
upon her honour, "the whole 
force o£ Chinese thought aml 
teaching would then be' enlisted 
in the foreigner's favour. Such a 
cha.nge o£ pxinciple in the making-
of treaties would widen and not 
re trict the field £or both merchant 
and missionary, would do away 
with il'l'itating ]Jrivileges and place 
native and ioreigner on the sa.me 
footing, a~d wo·uld remove tlle 
sting of hummiation a.nd put the 
government of China on the sa.me 
plane as o1 her governments. u,e -
tore jurisdiction (to the Chinese) 
and the feeling o£ the respon ibil-
ity to protect as· well as the ap-
preciation o£ (foreign) intercourse 
will at once move up to a higher 
pla.ne." Dr. Tyau in this and other 
o·f his writings on China mentions 
the anti-opium c;ampaign as a 
proo£ of what China can arhiew 
when plar.ed upon her honour. 
Nit· Hobert Hart was writing 
just after the Boxer outbreak and 
few of our rearlerSJ . who lived iu 
China at that time would have 
been, prepared to endorse his views 
even then. Dr. 'fyau who has 
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tnade use o£ his arguments se~etl• 
teen years later, appeals £or Gliina 
to be judged by her ariti-opium 
campaign. By it, then, le-t her 
be judged! 
An Anti-Opium Edict issued in 
1906 ordered the entire abolition of 
opium-smoking within ten years 
from January 1, 1907. At that 
time China was importing over 
th1 ee thousand tons o£ foreign 
opium per annum, ehiefty from 
India. ObviouRly t.he anti-opium 
campaign could not succeed if 
tlwusa.ncls o£ tollS o:£ the drug oon-
tinued to come in. from abroad. 1t 
'TU S equally obviotlS that the 
~uccess of a cumpaign to suppress 
a deeply-rooted habit among the 
Ghinese peopile, even i£ the import-
ation, of foreign opium ceased, 
would b in doubt. 'l'he value of 
the foreign opime: trade amounb~ ti 
lo milliolls of pound sterling per 
annum, and even though seriou. 
mo·ral issues were involved., the 
(-:lovennnent of India ··ottid harcllv 
be expected forthwith to sacrifie'e 
this immense revenue If the O'ltly 
result would he increased opiun1 
cultivation in China. Tlhe Briti;;h 
'G7 
and Chinese Governments there-
fore entered into an agreement for 
a probationary period of three 
yeal.'s, under which the export ot 
opium from India to Cihina. would 
be redueed by 5,100 chests. per 
annum, o•r ten per rent., of the 
total Indian expo_rt to this coun-
try; China., on h r part, engaging 
that native production would he 
reduced in the' same ratio. This 
arrangement proving satisfactory 
was. extended in 1911, with th~ 
object of bringing about the com-
plete extinction of the Indian 
opium tra.de by the end of 1917. 
Arrangement.s were also made fo1 
the ces. ation of the import of In · 
dian opium inio any province' 
which could establish by c!lear 
evidence "that it hM effectively 
suppres ed the cultivation and im-
porrt o·f native opium." Agajn the 
experiment of putting China, up011 
her mettle seemed to be justified, 
and though, subsequent to the 
He,olution, the term. of the serond 
Anglo-Chinese agreement were 
frequently violated by the Pro-
vincial Autho·rities, the anti-Opium 
movement rna le such progress 
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that £r01m April 1913 the. Indian 
Governme~t suspended sales ot 
certificated opium £or the hinese 
market. :U"rom that elate, there-
fore, the import o:f Indian opmm 
into China became illegal. 
As long as the Oent.ral Goverr.-
ment. possessed a vestige ot autbor-
iiy over tl1 e "ProvinceR, , incere, atn·d 
on the whole e!Tedive, measul'PK 
were adopted to SU}Jpl'esl'l> ilw 
cultivation of, and traffic in, 
opium. But :from 19'17 onward:-< 
the situation ha~ steadily grown 
worse. One provinc.e• attei' another 
has been added to the liRt ot 
backsliders, and today there is not 
a Province or Territory o£ Chin:t 
with the possible exception ot 
Shansi . in which :my sr,1·ious at-
tempt is made hy the local :mthor-
iLies to suppress th o-pium haff,,•_ 
In many o£ i.he · Province. tlJe 
poppy is: now cultivated unJer the 
protection, i£ not unJer the order;;, 
o£ tllf' T 1uchuns and the•ir sub-
ordinates. Opium is produced in 
and exported_ £rom the Vl estern 
and Southweste.tn provinces by the 
ton. So general and so lucrati ,,e 
is the tr;:tffi • that a 11 attempts 1 o 
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cope with its revival have proved 
futile. A mere fraction of t h r 
smuggled. drug is seized in the 
para.tively few Treaty Ports where 
'the Maritime Gustoms £unctions. 
Mo1'e t.b,an sixty-six tons of opium 
weTl• seized by the C:nstoms Aut.h-
oritiPs in 1921, and upward, nf 
thi1ty tons. in 1922. Th Criminal 
Code prescribes severe penrlliti!'S 
fot the pr'Odu.rtion, tJ·ans1wrt,, sale 
or consumption o1 opium. The 
President from, time to' time issues 
strong- Manda.tes ordering the com-
plete suppression o·f opium. But 
no-OltP, tu];:e · anv notic:e'. The 
traffic. has revived and is in a 
flourishing condition. Com-
paratively few Chinese seem to £eel 
that there is anything dishonour-
al:Jle or humiliating in enteriu~ 
into solemn engagement with 
G1·eat Britain for the cessation of 
the lucrative Indo-Chinese Cl·pium 
trade, and reviving the produdi.on 
of, and traffic. in, Chinese opium, 
within a few yea1 o£ the expila-
tion of the· Anglo-Chinese opium 
agreemen~. 
Nati nal honour, we were told, 
wnulJ pmv a mor pow rful in. 
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spiration e:ven tlulllli Treaty stipula~ 
tions. No-one can serioosly credit 
that statement to-clay. For there 
is little sig'll of any ~atim:ia,l senti-
ment against the reviva,l of o;pium 
smoking. It is difficult to enlist 
c rrlin ese sympathies with the 
activities of the Inter:r1ational 
.Anii-Opium .Ass01eiation and its 
bra.nches. \Vthat• work has been 
ruchieved in the direction of restric-
ting the even mure dangeroos and 
insidious morphia t.raffic has be.en 
done almost entirely by foreigners. 
Practically the omly in:B.uential 
voice raiserl against the opium 
traffic to-day is that ot the In~ 
ternational ·Anti-Opium Associn-
tion of Peking. in the activities of 
which few Chi nllse now take an;y 
Herious inteJ.'est, and whio'h', in 
our opinion devotes fa.r too much 
of its ene•rgies' to critici m of 
wha.t is occurring outside China. 
'At the moment an alleged, a1nd in 
our belief entirely impracticable! 
Japanese scheme for .an op:iulm 
m Cinopoly is a.Urad.ing ('.Onsiderable 
attention:. If, ns is quite possible, 
relegn..lization of t.he opium traffic 
!ol' a limited pe1'iod proves to be ths 
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only means of restm'ing CQllitrol 
over the pi'olluction and oousump-
tion of the llrug, the la ·t }Je1·son.s 
to whom the opel'ation of the 
monopoly should he entrusted arc 
an iiTesponsible Japanese grom.p, 
who e proposals have been repud-
iated by the .Tapanes3 I_.egation, 
n~u.d ~~~hose ma.in punJose appears to 
be to create security ior the Iepa,v-
mcnt of existing and future Japan-
e. e Loans. 
An opium monopoly for a limit-
ed period o[ years under r ·ponsibJa 
foi 'eign supervision ma.y eve•nt.ually 
provtl to be the only practicable 
Aolut.ion of Ohina's ol'ium pr1'10!blem:. 
Bu1t the whole que tion will de-
mand handling with extreme care. 
T'he est.ablishment of such a mono-
poly would constitute a serious 
breach of China's internationaL 
engagem~nts, and eould only be 
justified i£ satisfactory guarante 
were produced that it w10tuld be n. 
step towards the abolition, and not 
towards the permanent revival, o£ 
the opium traffic. And it would, 
in our opinion, be essential that iJl1e 
revem1es derived therefrom be 
earmarked £or some urgent nation-
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al need, such as the disbandment. 
()f troops. The view has frequent-
ly been expressed in these oolumns 
that the problems of clis.balrudment 
and the suppression of opi1u1m are 
so closely interrelated that they 
must be dealt with simultaneously 
if any satisfactory solution is to be 
found. I£ tba.t view is correct the 
idea of allowing a Japanese 
:fi11a.ncial syndicate to exploit the 
opium haffic for the advantage of 
itself or its nationals must be sum-
' ma1ily reject€d. 
X. 
'l'HE MEJWUANT OLAS. '. 
WE have glanced rapidly, but we 
hope not unfairly, over the 
outstanding features of Ohina's 
present adm~ntistrative chaQs. We 
now turn to another side o£ the 
lJicture.. Although since 1911 
China has been almos.t CQll'tinuous-
ly racked by civil war and internal 
dissension ~h1e gro s value of he1· 
foreign tratle inc1·ea ed from Hk. 
'1'1 . 870,986,477 iu 1911 ro Hk. 
Tls. 1,560,833,178 in 1921. The 
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i.rxl'ease has hoon mainly in im-
ports, which have more than dou-
bled during the period refened to. 
There has unquestiona,hly, since 
the establishment of t.he ltepublic, 
been a greatly inm·eased dtJill1.and 
for foreign machinery of every 
kind. The import of eloot.rical 
machinery and a,pparatus in 1921 
was nearly ten times as great in 
value as tha.t i.nl 1911. And the im-
port of other kinds o£ machinery 
has shown as grea.t an, if not a 
greater, increase. Factories equip-
ped with mode1m· machinery ha;ve 
been springing up all over the 
country. The industries of the 
oountry have expanded to a phen-
omenal extent. A'nd the war, 
which shn,t off many world markets 
from their usual sources of supply 
stimulated exports of raw and 
manufactured materials for which 
Ohiina. had neve·r previously been 
in the ma.rket,. 
In view of the diffiawlties and 
uncertainty under which trade has 
been conducted in C:hina. this great 
expansion in t.ra.de and industry 
argues extra.orrdinary persistence 
!lnd entel.'prise on the part of her 
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citizens. It must be considered un-
fortunate that the Ohinese mer-
chant claS>S, while capa,ble of re-
ma:nka ble p·erseverance in the colll-
duc.t of trade and industry under 
the most adverse conditians, does 
not displa.y the same q)u.alities in 
politics. A handful of tm1bulent 
1u1d undisciplined students will in-
timidate iihe merchants of a whole 
city into participation in a, boycott 
or other movement with which iu 
their hearts, few or any of them 
a.pprove. Similarly, the merchants 
!mbmit without am.y eerious attempt 
at resistance to the e:x:ac.tions and 
oppression of the militarists, year 
a.fter year. They permit themselves 
to be blackmailed into making 
huge and illegal "contributions" 
towards the support of armies 
which they know, only too well, 
constitute a. serious menace to their 
interes,ts. In enterprises olf a.n 
official or semi-official characte11· in 
which. thev are invited to co-
operate, or· offer their co-opelration, 
they seem inca,pa.ble of excluding 
volitical influences, with all the in-
efflcieucy and corrupholll which 
their intrusion entails. As an O'r-
ganized body they hiave hitherto 
ab ·ta.ined from entering ~nrto 
politic ·, leaving the field clear to 
the professional politicians, o:t 
whose unworthiness the present 
Parliament gives fresh1 proofs al-
most daily. 
The passivity of the Chinese 
metch:mt c.la,ss is the mpst dis-
coUI·aging feain.11re orf the present 
situation. Only on very ra;re 
oc.casiolns will they stand up for 
their rights, and hy concerted 
action, force the local authorities, 
or thie Central GoJVernment. to give 
heed to their views. In political 
matters they seem to be swayed by 
any p•laUS>i•ble charlat:m, or even by 
a m01b orf half-educated school-
boys. They will usually follow the 
line of least resistance, though ex-
perience oll.lg-ht by this. time to have 
convinced them that it would pay, 
in the lointg run. to oppose move-
ments in whjc:h ifuey nave no faith, 
with whicn tb.ev have no real svm-
pathy, and which must inevi~,bly 
fa.il to achieve any useful purpose. 
The O!llly real holpe o£ the nation 
at the moment is the entry into 
politics of the Ohincl>~ mercihant 
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class. It s.eemed, but a few m01nths 
ago, that the Ohinese Chambers o£ 
Oommell'Ce had been really roosed 
by the pretensions and maladmin- · 
istrahon o£ the militarists, and 
that a. nation-wide anti-militarist 
campaign might result. Blult the 
movement already seems to haYe 
died down. And the merchants, 
~nsteacl of repudiating Paa:liamemt 
and its absurdities>, to-day seem 
willing ta allo•w theiiilselves once 
again to be exploited by politicians 
and tudents in a campaign whidhi 
cannot bring any good to their 
country, and can onJy result in 
friction with Japan . 
The only really constructive 
effort emanating from the merchant 
class under the Republic has been 
the/ foi,mation o£ the Chinese Bank-
ing Group, which u!ndertoo~c to 
financ{) the needs o£ the Gorvern-
ment Railway$, and the construc-
tion of the Shang•hJa.i :M::int. The 
Government. Railways have beem 
sei,e.d, and operated for their own 
benefit, by the militarist without 
any effective protest. The Shang-
hai Mint still remains unequipped, 
bcca.us~ the funds necessary to pa.y 
for the machinery which has 
already been imported, a,:re not 
a.vail'able. And even if the plant 
were installed the real purpose of 
the Mint-tihe substitlu1tilon of the 
dollar :for the tael as the uon,it oi£ 
national omTency--would not be 
achieved, for the proposals of the 
.FoYrign Excha,nge Bank~, whose 
co-operation would be es entia} to 
make the project a suecess, have 
been ignoi'ed. 
The il·ut.h seems to be that, 
shrewd and enterprising us the 
Chinese nlC!rchaJJt a:nd hanker may 
bfl as an individual, collectively 
they are inca.pable of efficient or 
conRh uctive effort. Thiey will sel-
clom adopt u. definite po.Jicy ana 
pursue it, regardless of the con-
srqueuces. They almost invaria.bly 
prefer indir ct, and therefore un-
f:a tisfactory, means o£ workimg· :for 
1.hrir 11articular ends. 'fhe mer-
c·hanis at 'rsingtn.o, if .J a pane e 
were in league with the bandits a 
was alleged, could have put the 
Japanese Authtoii'itie' entir•ely in 
tlw wmng at the iime of rendition, 
b.y pu,blicly 1·evealing their appi·e-
hensions, rund calling upon t"Qe 
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Japanese, and later, the Clhinese, 
auiih'orities- to adopt effective pre-
ca•utions. Instead of that they 
feasted and attempted ~o bri!be the 
bandits, with the- result that an 
attempt was made to blackmail 
them beyond their capacity to pay, 
so that every Ohinese merchant of 
any prominence had to g01 iJillt(ll hid-
ing or leave the city. In the 
Chinese Hace C'lu.b of Chihli we 
hia.ve yet another example of the 
difficulty o£ secm•ing harmonious 
co-operatiOlD. among the Ghinese 
merchants. 'l'he recent trouble 
fleems to have been due to the 
attempt on the paJ't of .cine o~ more 
of the promoters of the enterprise 
to remove from the Committee a 
member of whose conduct they diJ 
not appro>e. In:;tead o£ oppo ing 
the unJrovular committee-man open-
ly, one of hi~ opponents appears to 
have invoked the aid of the Pro-
vincial Assembly, which passed a 
law prohibiting gam:bHng. I£ this 
law remai'Ils in force the days od' 
the Race Club will be numbered, 
for t.he Chinese take little or no · 
intere t in racing apart from its 
gambling features, 
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1£ China's merchants, as a body, 
could be induced to devote :to the 
interest'>' of their comntry a mere 
hadion of the persistooce, shrewd-
ness .a.nd business capacity which 
they disp1a.y in connec.t.ion with 
theci.r own interests, it woruld not 
he long ibefore there was a. radica.l 
chlange in the political outlook. As 
long as they submit withorut otpposi-
tion to the preten. ions of mili-
tarists, politiciams and school-~l.;oys, 
little or 110 improvement in con-
ditions in this country can be ex-
pectml. 
XI. 
PrOSSIBILI'ffiES. 
JT is cu. tomary to wM'n those 
who become impatient in IC-
gard to the administrative ohao" 
in this country tha.t the political 
trans:f.ol'mat.ion o£ a nation of up-
wa.rds of -foul" hundred millions of 
people is a prooess which cannot 
reas<mably be expected to be cur-
ried thro·ugh, successfully, in the 
course oi a ferw year& ; that pre-
I 
I 
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vwus revolutions, m• change:;' in 
. dynasty in hiua. have bee;u fol-
lowed' by many years o£ comple1e 
disorganization ; and that, left 
alone, and guarunteeu agaiusl 
foreign aggre sion, tho Ghinese 
Republic wiill pro•bably develop 
into a stable and satisfac.to•ry sys-
tem of G overnm(mt. There i:; coH-
siderable force in some of the;;o 
arguments. But it must no,t be 
forgotten that the network o:£ te]e-
graphs throughout the country, 
and the development o:£ railway 
and postal communications, ha:v~ 
removed one of the main obstacles 
to the rapid solution of China's 
administrative problems. peking 
knows, to-day, what happened in 
Canton, ye-sterday, a.ud vice versa. 
Thousands of newspapers in all 
parts of the eount.ry keep the reaJ-
ing public moi'e or les accurately 
informed: of what is happening in 
different parts o£ China, and in 
foreign lands. H, as its support-
ers maintain, the country is rea 1-
ly ripe for, and in fa.vom· of, re-
public~nism, some progress ought 
to be percept.iblle after eleven year:; 
of political tmmoil. 
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We doubt whether history can 
~how a single instanc.e in whi<"h 
a country where the percentage of 
illitera<:y is as high as in China 
has made a success o·f Republican 
Government. The word "repub-
li c" nnd the theol'ies o£ democratic 
gorvernment, appear to have do-
minated the minds o£ Ghina's 
politicians, to the exclusion o£ all 
practical considerations, since the 
First Revolution. China was not 
ripe for republicanism in 1911; 
she is not ripe £or it to-day; and 
we do not believe it po sible for 
her to become a Republic in aught 
but name within the next century. 
It was hoped by the MaJlchu GoY-
ernment- whic.h p1esuruably had 
reliable jJJ:£ormation on which to 
ba e it plans-tha.t at the endl n r 
the seventh year of the njne-year 
f•onstitutional programme, one per 
cent.. o,f the populat,ion would ht• 
alJle to 1·ead and WJite! The 
Dynasty was overtJno-wn at the 
end o£ the fourth yea1·. It is dit-
ftcult to believe that this pe•rcent-
ng-e of literacy has yet been attain-
ed. A Manchu autocracy has been 
succ.eeded by a militarist oligarchy, 
I ~ 
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eaoh member o£ which pla.ys only 
fo·r his own hand, and treats the 
so-called Government with con-
tempt. An election, even on the 
1·estricted franchise. adopted in 
1912, which! will give Ohina a 
Parliament really representa.tive of 
the enhanchised classes, is out o£ 
the question, under existing con-
ditio'll,s. And a P'axliament com-
posed of the Tuchuns' nominee~, 
andl o£ rrofe>:sional politician who 
have bought their seats, is a hind-
rance, not a help, to the adminis-
tm~ion, and an insuperable ob-
stacle to , table and satisfac.torv 
foreign reluJions. · 
It is impossible t01 predict, w1tn 
any certainty, what. the fuhne 
will bring forth. T!here i." alway:-~ 
the possibility, o£ course, that one 
or other of China's ambitious milt-
taiists will beat down or intimid-
ate a!ll his. rival , and, £or' a briel 
spell dominate the country af' 
Di tator, Emperor, or pseudo-
President. Such a development 
would, in our opinion, be unlikely 
to pl"oiVide a. permanent solution ot 
Clhina's problem, for no S<>oner 
ha.d one ambitious militarisrt e<l-
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tahlished his ascendancy than 
others. wouldl conspir•e to overthrow 
him, and it would be merely a 
question of time befo1'e wha.t was 
gained by t.he sword, by the sword 
was overthrown. 
If it be assumed, as we think 
it mus·t be assumed, that a really 
republican goven1ment, "broad-
based uporn the people's wiU," is 
outside the scope of practical 
politics, and a militaTy dictator-
ship, by whomevel' assumed, will 
be ephemeral and merely serve to 
perpetuate internal st1-ife, only 
one other olution, which offers 
any hope o·f an early improrvement, 
reunification of the country, and 
orderly political evolution, can be 
regarded as feasible-a constitu-
tional monarchy. This was' the 
solution favoured! by many com-
petent o•bservers in 1912. It re-
mains a po siblle, though not au 
·easy, solution to-day. The idea oJ 
restoring the Manchu Dyna ·ty tn 
the Throne-and as far as orne can 
·ee there is no othe1• possible comse 
if monarchical gorvernment is re-
tored-would be certain to arou&e 
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furious an'd no~sy oppositiou 
among- the p1·o£ession al }Joli licians 
who tint! pscuclo-republic:lllism o·f-
fers so favourable a. field for grafL 
and intrigue. A Manchu Iestor-
ation, however, would, if it. offered 
any reasona.hle prospect o.f peace 
and administ.rati ve stability, com-
mend itself liolh to• the mer ·ha11 L 
cla·s, and · to the Chinese ma se", 
throughout the greater paJ.'t o£ the 
countr'Y. There might be se1ious 
opposition in some of the So·utheru 
ptovinces, but even in South China 
the people. must be weary of inces-
sant. strife, and inclined, to-day, to 
acce•pt any solution which seems 
likely 1o ~ead to peace. The 
most important factor woold be the 
attitude of the militarists. Would 
they accept the authority of the · 
Emperor, and accept it not as a 
matter merely of lip-service? 
There is reason to believe that 
many o£ them are monarchists at 
heart, and that their opposition to • 
the coup o•£ 191 I was due not to 
any question o£ principle, but to 
jealom y of General Chang Hsun, 
bv whom that coup was carried 
o~t. In the event of a mon,arcl:Iical 
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restoration, accoon panied by pled-
ge of. their support, their vanity 
would probably be fiatteil'ed by the 
CIOI!lferment of hereditary titles, 
and the cnnfirma.tion of .their posi-
tiO<niS as Viceroys or Governors of 
the Provinces over whic.h, a.t pre-
sent, they h:we control. One could 
not expect, nor WIOittlcl one desire, 
the Monarrhy, if restored, to revert 
to the absolute autocracy of pre-
revolution days, though it would 
be necessary, i:f any real imprO<Ve-
ment were to be effected, for t .he 
Imperial authority over the pro-
vincial satraps to be, in a very large 
measure, re-established. It wo·ulrl 
be ne essary, also, to aoolis'bl the 
present Parliament, and to mr-
ganize a legislature more repre-
sentative of the na.tiorn, in which, 
as in the old Tzuohengyuan, a 
balance would be maintained be-
tween selected and elected mem-
bers. And to make government 
practicruhle at all, wide powers 
would have to be conferred upon 
the Executive. Administrative re-
form, and the condu:c.t of Ohina' s 
foreign relatic'D.s aJ"e alike impo -
sible when Pa.rliamen,t claims a-n1d 
. I 
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a.Hempts to exercise thE! power o£ 
embarrassing the Executive at 
every turn. 
A Constitutional Monarchy seems 
to offer the best hope of stall::le gov-
emment in Ohina.. If, however, 
for one reason m· auort:her a restora-
tion proves impos ible in the near 
future, it may be wga.rded as 
virtually certain that the Chihli 
Party will proceed with its plans 
for ejecting President Li Yuan-
hung, and installing General Tsao 
Kunin his place. That this would 
a.rouse as much, if not more, opposi-
tion throughout the SoUJt.h than a 
M:.anchu restoration, goe withorut 
sr..ying. Tsao Kun has a.bsolrurtely 
no claims to the Presidency exceyt 
the ±act that his militru'Y and 
political adherents hope, by instal-
ling him, to further their own in-
terests. It i doubrtful whether 
he, himself, aspires t.o the Presi-
dency. No really representative 
legislature would accord him a frac-
tiolll .o.f the votes necessary to 
seclllre hi~ "ele-ction." He would 
retain the position only for so lolllg 
as the militarv forces under his 
own and hi 'H; bordin.ates' oollltrol 
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were a1ble to de.feat 01r to intimidate 
his C')Jpoments. No-one acquainted 
with his record can seriou ly sup-
pose that he i:- China's ''man oi' 
destinv.'' 'rhe fact that there 
should be all this scheming and 
c.onspiring tv substitute him for 
P'residr.nt J,j Yuan-hung is, per-
hap,c;, the most conclusive p~oo£ ihat 
repuhlicaJJism, as the wmd is gen-
rmlly understood, does not exist in 
China. In a c.oruntry wherre the 
choice of its Ghief E,xecutive rested 
with the people, General Tsao 
Kun's nnme would never even 
appear on the list oi' candida,tes for 
1lw Presi.lcmcy. 
